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ABSTRACT 
 
A democratic progressive Pakistan is tied with a Pakistani identity based on the 
facts of plurality of its being. And conversely, a centrist militarist Pakistan as it 
must always rely on the religious argument will continue to give in to the rise of 
religious extremism in society and state. The main argument of the present article 
is that there is a direct connection and overlapping of interests between 
democratic governance and ethnic based plural identity in Pakistan. Further the 
religious based identity is fed by and feeds the conflict with India, contributing in 
a substantial manner to the military dominance; conversely the ethnic national 
movements by conflicting with the centrist state upheld by the military are part of 
the regional peace movement.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Pakistan is a state of contending identities. These contentions are 
operational at two levels, parallel and horizontal. On parallel 
level is the contention emerging from the religious basis of its 
creation. There is a debate between those who consider Pakistani 
identity to be basically religious, to be more precise, Islamic, and 
those who, though agreeing to Muslim identity of Pakistan, argue 
that being Muslim does not mean being Islamic. They point out 
to the essentially secular personality of the leader of Pakistan 
movement, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. However, both are centrist 
positions and have found each other as useful partners against the 
ethnic/national identity contentions. This has been generally true 
at least till Gen. Musharaf took over in 1999 and more 
specifically after the post 9/11 2001 change in Pakistani foreign 
policy.  
 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 
 51 
These centrist identities are in turn challenged by 
regional/provincial and ethnic identities, that include Pashtun, 
Baloch, Sindhi, Punjabi and since 1980s the Muhajir (refugee, 
[refugees from India who came to Pakistan after 1947, not the 
Afghan refugees). There are other identities contending for 
recognition along with these. They include Saraiki in Punjab, 
Makranis and Barohis in Balochistan and Chitralis, Gilgitis and 
Hazarawals in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). The 
real debate and contest is between the centrist religious based 
(irrespective of the debate between the Muslim Nationalist or 
Islamic fundamentalist stands) and these ethnic/national 
contentions, that in the opinion of this study has the real potential 
for a fundamental change in Pakistan’s decision making and 
democratic or otherwise development.  
 
The post colonial state of Pakistan characterized by long 
direct military rules, and continuous military control, lack of 
democratic political culture and an immature and weak civil 
society had been pursuing a policy of creating a unitary state 
national identity of Pakistan by negating the existence of the 
multi ethnic and plural reality of the society. This has resulted in 
a culture of intolerance and undemocratic governance. 
 
While there are good studies on identity of state and 
society of Pakistan, most take centrist positions. Amongst the 
centrist positions Waseem’s stands
1
 out as a liberal albeit centrist 
position, even if he appears to be sympathetic to the peripheral 
view. The study by Cohen
2
 also suffers from the same limitation 
as it views the identity crisis as it appears from the center and 
does not show any appreciation of the non centrist secular 
                                                 
Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Progressive 
Publishers, Lahore, 1989. Also read by the same author Mohammad Waseem, 
‘The Dialectics between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy’, in Pakistan; 
Nationalism without a Nation?, Christopher Jafferlot, Manmohar, (Ed) New 
Delhi, 2002, pp. 263–282. 
2Stephen Cohen, The Nation and State of Pakistan’, The Washington 
Quarterly, 25(3), Washington, Summer 2002, pp. 109–122. 
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perspectives. The issue looks different when looked at from the 
various ethno nationalist points of view. While to the centrist 
liberal the issue is how to secularize Islam. They do it by 
emphasizing the difference between Muslim and Islamic. 
However, as they are viewing the issue from a unitary identity 
stand point, they limit their argument to only administrative 
justice and issues of democratic representation and fair 
distribution of assets. While these may be very important, they 
do not represent the whole picture. Their perspective is simply an 
argument for a gradual evolution of a central unitary identity 
based on willing and democratic involvement of the various 
contending ethno national identities and their final erosion. The 
issue for the ethno nationalist is a system of governance that 
guarantees protection of their cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
economic and political identity within a federal, democratic and 
secular Pakistan. While the ethno nationalist liberal democratic 
view shares with its centrist counterpart concerns about 
democracy, Islamaization, and militarization of the State, their 
agendas differ when one goes beyond these issues. For the 
centrist liberal the journey ends with these issues, while for the 
ethno nationalist it continues for the achievement of recognition 
of their separate identity. While the centrist liberal considers the 
existence of these contending identities to be a temporary 
phenomenon, for the ethno nationalist Pakistan can only survive 
as a State if it accepts and adapts itself to a plural multi ethnic 
identity. Further, the centrist liberal has time and again 
compromised on democratic principles and conceptually centrism 
feeds on statism, which results in militarism and thus is 
circumscribed to play the role of democratizing the state and 
society of Pakistan.  
 
The military action authorized by the secular and populist 
Bhutto against the Pashtun and Baloch nationalists in the 1970s 
are more glaring examples of the difference between the centrist 
non religious thought and the pluralist point of view. In the post 
Zia era (1979–1988), known for the increased role of religion in 
state affairs increased Talibanization of Pakistani State and 
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society may have brought the ethno nationalist and centrist 
democrat closer, the basic difference between the two persists. 
While the centrist at times finds the military domination of 
decision making in Pakistan acceptable and at times shares the 
military’s attitudes towards Kashmir and India, the ethno 
nationalist has consistently been at odds with the military 
domination and opposed to the India centric security perceptions 
of the State, Kashmir, Afghanistan and nuclear policy. 
 
This paper explains the relationship between lack of 
democratic culture of tolerance and acceptance of the other, and 
insistence on a unitary religious based identity, militarization and 
religious extremism. Pakistan has evolved in a peculiar manner 
with both internal and external dynamics leaving their imprint on 
its identity and determining its governance, impacting both state 
and society and their mutual relations. The study looks at current 
issues of governance by examining the debate about democracy 
and governance in its historical perspective and finds that issues 
of identity lies at the heart of them. The paper looks at these 
issues from an ethno-nationalist point. It is argued that a 
democratic secular Pakistan is only possible through evolving a 
multi ethnic identity and federal structure guaranteeing the rights 
and identity of the many ethnicities that make the society of 
Pakistan. 
 
Pakistani State 
Pakistan very neatly fits the description of a post colonial state. 
Post colonial state refers to the continuation of colonial 
economic relations and thus continuity of political control of the 
ex–colony by the former colonial power. Further, it also means 
the continuation of influences on attitudes and the state society 
relations. Post colonial states by inheriting the bureaucratic 
structures, made and trained to suppress the civil society, main 
purpose being to control rather than to organize for development, 
continue to face the dilemmas of a conflict over control between 
the civil society and the military and non military bureaucracies.  
It did not take long for the colonial system of bureaucratic 
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control and authoritarian centralism to reproduce itself in the new 
state structure. A primary reason for this outcome was the 
weakness of the available political organisation and its roots in 
the civil society.
3
 
 
Central leadership of Pakistan mainly came from areas 
that were left on the Indian side of the partition. More blood had 
been spilled during partition than for attainment of independence. 
The security perception of this new State was shaped by 
experiences of freedom struggle. For Pakistan, freedom struggle 
was not just the struggle of the people of India for freedom from 
the British imperial rule, but more significantly, the movement 
was for avoiding being ruled by the Hindu majority in a united 
and independent India. So, Pakistan movement was more anti 
Hindu than anti imperialism/colonialism. This religious 
undertone of Pakistan movement based on the fears of a Hindu 
majority provides the basic point of reference to Pakistan’s 
foreign policy throughout its existence. This also is the basic 
contradiction in its quest for identity, this society and state faces 
till today. 
 
Religion and Unitary Nation Identity 
The role of religion in creating a separate political identity as 
justification for the creation of Pakistan has played havoc with 
the issue of national identity. The marriage of secular concept of 
nationalism with Muslim religious identity and coining of the 
term Muslim nationalism,
4
 and thus making this a basis for a 
Pakistani state and society that is a modern and not a theocratic 
state has made most centrist Pakistani scholars apologetic. The 
                                                 
3Gardezi Hasan, ‘Making of the Neo–Colonial State in South Asia: The 
Pakistan Experience’ in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East, xvii (2), 1997, p. 88. Also read, Mohammad Waseem, 1989. 
4For good articulation of this particular Pakistani predicament differentiating 
between Muslim nationalism which is the basis for Pakistani nationalism and 
Islamic theocratic identity read Hamza Alvi, ‘Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity 
and Ideology; State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan’, in Fred 
Halliday and Hamza Alvi, (Ed.) Monthly Review of Press, New York, 1988. 
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gradual growth of religion in governance, and policy making and 
implementing, especially in its relations with India and 
Afghanistan and dealing with ethno-national identities, has 
strengthened the religious content of the Pakistani identity 
question. 
 
From its very inception, the state of Pakistan was thought 
to be more than a physical/legal entity that provided welfare, 
order, and justice to its citizens. Pakistan was to be an 
extraordinary state—a homeland for Indian Muslims and an 
ideological and political leader of the Islamic world. Providing a 
homeland to protect Muslims—a minority community in British 
India—from the `bigotry’ and `intolerance’ of India’s Hindu 
majority was important. The Pakistan movement also looked to 
the wider Islamic world, however, and Pakistan’s leaders have 
been concerned about the fate of other Muslim communities 
living under duress, stretching from Palestine to the Philippines. 
Both the history and the future of Pakistan are rooted in this 
duality, a complex relationship between Pakistan the state—a 
physically bounded territory with a legal and international 
personality—and Pakistan the nation—mission–bound to serve as 
a beacon for oppressed or backward Muslim communities 
elsewhere in the world. Other causes include an attempt to create 
a truly Islamic state within Pakistan, one that would be guided by 
Islamic scriptures and traditions.
5
 
 
Islam has been used as a tool of policy by Pakistani state 
throughout its existence. It has been used both in foreign and 
domestic policies. This tool graduated into a full and equal 
partner in decision making with Gen. Zia Ul Haq’s military coup 
de’ tat in 1977. Support for Islamists in Afghanistan during 
1980s was both a result of this continuously growing alliance 
between the Pakistani State and the religious right and a 
crystallization point for the upgradation of the status of the 
                                                 
5Stephen Cohen, `The Nation and State of Pakistan’ in ‘The Washington 
Quarterly, 25(3), Washington, Summer 2002, pp. 109–122 at 109. 
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religious forces in State affairs. This fitted well with the US 
strategy of confronting the Soviet Union (Communism) generally 
as well as more specifically in Afghanistan. Pakistani 
establishment had always found the religious right a good 
ally/tool in its India policy as well as (more importantly for the 
purposes of this study) dealing with voices of dissent within the 
country. Religious right has considered ethnic nationalism as an 
enemy as much as the Pakistani State had, rather more so. That 
has become more evident from Pakistan’s Kashmir policy that 
hinges on support for Mujahideen and militant groups in the post 
Soviet Afghanistan period. However, it must be remembered that 
even before the Afghan experience Pakistani State never had any 
liking for secular Kashmiri nationalists like Sheikh Abdullah or 
even Kashmiri separatists demanding an autonomous State based 
on secular Kashmiri identity, like Kashmir Liberation Front. 
Domestically, Pakistani establishment have found ready and 
useful allies in the religious forces in its attempts to deal 
militarily with the 1971 uprising of Bengalis in the then East 
Pakistan or Pashtuns via religious forces among Afghan 
Pashtuns. 
 
The oligarchy comprising feudal politicians, civil servants 
and military officers that ran Pakistan in its early years saw the 
Islamists as a barrier against the potential tide of ethnic 
nationalism, which they saw as a threat to Pakistan’s integrity. 
India was seen as backing the ethnic-based political movements 
in an effort to undo Pakistan. The Islamists, with their anti-Hindu 
bias, were also seen as useful in forestalling Indian influence 
within Pakistan. 
 
The mainly secular elite of the country had assumed that 
they would continue to lead the country while rallying the people 
on the basis of Islamic ideology. But Muslim theologians and 
activists, organized in religious parties such as the Jamaat–e–
Islami, saw each ‘concession’ to Pakistan’s Islamic identity as a 
victory against the secular elite. Although small in number, and 
stigmatized by their pre-independence opposition to the idea of 
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Pakistan, the Islamist leaders started articulating the vision of 
Pakistan as a state organized on Islamic principles. The Islamists 
demanded that the new nation should assume its role as the 
leader of the Muslim world and run its affairs according to the 
theologians’ interpretation of God’s word.  These Islamists have 
become so assertive over time, especially after the Zia interlude 
that Maulana Maududi (founding leader of Jamat–e–Islami Party 
of Islam, who has provided intellectual inspiration to a large 
number of Islamic fundamentalists not just in Pakistan) has been 
presented as the ideologue of Pakistan along with M A Jinnah 
(founding father of Pakistan, referred to as Quad–e–Azam) as 
founder and Allama Iqbal (the poet philosopher considered as the 
person who presented the idea of Muslim separatism) as thinker 
of Pakistan. 
 
Pakistani establishment have found religious extremists 
as natural choice for alliance/usage as tools of foreign policy due 
to its own religious identity basis, its perception of India as a 
Hindu State, which has not accepted Pakistan as an independent 
state deep down. The United States also considered Islamic 
forces as good allies during the cold war against atheist Soviet 
Union and the centrist post colonial Pakistani State, dominated 
by the military has always considered secular, nationalist and 
democratic forces a challenge to its hold over power.
6
 This 
provided the basis of alliance between the two on the simple 
principle that enemy of enemy is a friend. 
 
As pointed out above, for Muslim League leadership that 
made up most of Pakistani elite after 1947, during the struggle 
for Pakistan, the real opponent was not the British imperial rule, 
but the Indian National Congress, which they perceived to 
represent Hindus. This experience of Pakistan movement and the 
tragic events of partition became the basis of a strong perception 
that Indian leadership had not accepted the division of the sub–
                                                 
6For a comprehensive study of the United States support for militant religious 
groups in Afghanistan read John K. Cooly, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, 
America and International Terrorism, New Delhi, Penguin, 2001, pp.48–65. 
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continent and would not miss any opportunity to undo it. These 
perceptions were strengthened by the annexation of Hyderabad, 
Junagardh and most of Kashmir by India. The denial of what 
Pakistan considered to be its fair share in assets of united India, 
was interpreted as a further indication of Indian plan to 
economically strangulate the new state at birth.
7
 The fact that 
most of the Muslim League leadership came from territories that 
did not become part of the state they had struggled for and in 
which they became refugees, was also significant factor in 
evolving India-centric threat perceptions of the new born state. 
Thus security policy became the central concern that determined 
the content and contours of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic 
policy. Dominance of security policy paved the way for military 
dominance of State establishment and society. 
 
Religious based Identity, Security Perceptions and Ascendancy 
of Military  
With this background Army started a gradual journey towards 
almost total domination of Pakistan’s decision–making elite, 
especially but not only security policy. The domination of 
security concerns also led to the domination by security policy of 
overall foreign as well as domestic policy. “The primary reason 
for military’s emergence as the most influential element in … 
decision–making lies in its significance in the country’s power 
politics. It assumed the responsibility of guarding the Islamic 
ideological identity and frontiers of the country. The threat 
perception from India, viewed as a Hindu power which cannot 
bear the existence of an Islamic Pakistan, has provided a certain 
ideological justification to the argument that it is only the 
military establishment that can provide security to this 
ideological state. Projection of threat from India is fundamental 
to the survival of the Pakistani establishment that even views 
internal insecurity as a continuation of the external threat. 
Islamabad has always looked at the internal political turmoil as 
                                                 
7Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Economy 
of Defence, Vanguard, Lahore, 1991, pp. 25–48. 
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the doing of a ‘foreign hand’ (insinuating India). It is in this back 
ground that Army has always kept the Kashmir issue on the hot 
burner.”
8
  
 
Under Pakistan’s first military ruler, General Mohammad 
Ayub Khan (1958–69), the military vowed to build a modern, 
pro–Western Islamic state that would serve as a bulwark against 
Soviet communism. Although, religious parties disapproved of 
some of the liberalising domestic programme of Gen. Ayub 
Khan, they shared with the military the perception that viewed 
communism as the main threat to Islam. The military and 
mullahs regarded those Pakistanis who professed communism, 
socialism, ethnic and cultural nationalism and/or secularism, as 
their common enemy. 
 
In the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971, the 
religious lobby led by the Jamaat–I–Islami’s (JI) youth wings, 
actively joined the war alongside Pakistani troops fighting their 
secular Bengali opponents. The Razakars (Volunteer) force 
organised by the Pakistan Army was manned by those youths.
9
 
The crisis resulted in Bangladesh’s independence in December 
1971, after India intervened militarily. This important episode 
illustrates a basic convergence of perception between the 
essentially secular State and religious forces that sees nationalists 
as adversaries. Similarly, the welcoming of religious Afghan 
opposition groups and their leaders in the 1970s clearly 
underscores the point that even otherwise secular Pakistani 
establishment found common cause with religious groups 
especially when it came to dealing with Pashtun nationalists and 
in areas of foreign policy. It must be noted that though Pakistan 
                                                 
8Ayesha Sadiqua Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 
1979–1999: In Search of a Policy, Sang–e–Meel Publications, Lahore, 2003, 
pp 55–78 at p.56.  
9A.A.K. Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University 
Press, Karachi, 1998, pp. 78–79. 
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had a civilian government then, the supervision of the Afghans in 
1970s was supervised by the military.
10
  
 
The nexus between the centrist state establishment and the 
religious forces touched its prime during the regime of General 
Mohammed Zia–ul–Haq (1977–88), who joined hands with the 
religious parties even prior to overthrowing an elected 
government. Zia Ul Haq and the religious parties had a common 
domestic enemy – the secular mainstream political parties. Zia’s 
personal proclivities also matched those of his religious strategic 
partners. Rigid interpretations of Islamic injunctions and 
jurisprudence were introduced during Zia’s eleven years.
11
 His 
legacy still haunts the state and society of Pakistan. 
 
The current military disposition that started in 1999 has 
attempted to legitimize its rule on appeal to the modernizing and 
progressive agenda. Gen. Musharraf started with introduction of 
administrative reforms to devolve power to grass roots level. The 
actualization of that plan in the shape of local governments has in 
fact resulted in weakening of the provincial governments as there 
is turf war between the two. In differences between the federal 
and provincial governments, these local governments have 
become tools of the federal government, thus, undermining the 
federal state structure even further. The provinces though not 
representing the correct ethnic identities that make up Pakistan, 
nevertheless represents the lesser evil to a unitary state structure. 
On current reports of a proposed constitutional amendment to 
increase the powers of provinces a columnist identified the real issue 
being more of political culture and the reality of a vast difference that 
                                                 
10The individual responsible was the then Inspector General of Frontier 
Constabulary (a para-military force having regular army officers as 
Commanders) Maj. Gen. (Retd) Naseerullah Babar (Then a serving Brigadier, 
who joined PPP after retirement and continued his interests in Afghanistan). Gen. 
Babar who became interior minister in the Benazir Bhutto government (1993-
1997) is considered to be responsible for the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan. 
11 International Crisis Group Asia Report ‘Pakistan: The Mullahs and the 
Military’, No. 49, 20 March 2003, pp. 2–3. 
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exists in the word of law and reality of practice. He wrote, 
“Assuming the government agrees on reducing the Concurrent List to 
a bare minimum of four to seven subjects and also assuming the 
opposition votes for the constitutional amendment bill to make the 
change lasting, the big 'if' is whether this exercise will affect the 
fundamental power imbalance between the establishment comprising 
the military-bureaucracy combine and the political 
parties/parliament. After all there couldn't be a bigger paradox than 
the provinces becoming relatively more powerful but still being ruled 
by the same establishment…  
 
… The precise paradox to consider is that even though Pakistan 
is a federation, it is being ruled by the military – the head of the 
federation, President Pervez Musharraf, is a serving general. The 
country is essentially functioning as a unitary organism in an 
authoritarian manner. Will greater autonomy for the provinces 
change this fundamental paradigm? Even during the previous 
three periods of military rule by Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and 
Ziaul Haq - the legitimisation of their takeovers by the Supreme 
Court notwithstanding - Pakistan structurally remained a 
federation but was governed de facto as a unitary state. Thanks to 
this structural distortion of Pakistan's polity, the association 
between the centre and the provinces has never been that of two 
sovereigns 'independent of each other and yet dependent' but one 
of a delegator and delegates. The federal relationship was 
consultative only when the centre deemed it necessary”
12
 
 
The Civilian Interludes 
Pakistan has been ruled for most of its existence by the military 
directly. For the time when it has not been ruling directly, it has 
continued to control vital policy areas from behind the scene. 
Due to a variety of reasons, the civilian governments could not 
change this lopsided development of Pakistani State-society 
relationship. The above development has given birth to a 
particular mind set, which could only have been challenged by a 
                                                 
12  Adnan Rehmat, “Balancing Act”, The News on Sunday, 18 September 2005. 
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politically mature visionary leadership that had the simple 
understanding that it is only through democratic process and 
system that even their personal rules can acquire substance and 
sustenance. 
 
Pakistan is a heterogeneous country with ethnic, linguistic 
and regional diversity and socio-economic disparities. Pakistan's 
track record in accommodating these identities and 
discontinuities in the national mainstream has been rather 
disappointing. A monolithic notion of national identity and an 
authoritarian political and economic management could not 
accommodate the demands for political participation and 
economic justice by these identities and interests. The break up 
of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in December 
1971 was Pakistan's internal failure to create a sense of 
participation and socio-economic justice among the Bengalis of 
the then East Pakistan, who constituted the majority of Pakistan's 
population. In a bid to cover up its failure, the Pakistani state 
used brute force in East Pakistan, inflicting innumerable 
atrocities on the Bengalis. 
 
One sees a little change with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto taking 
over in late 1971. Pakistan Army stood discredited and the civil 
society was represented by the popular Bhutto. Under his 
leadership, Pakistan appeared to have learned a lesson from its 
East Pakistan experience. So in 1970s one notes a move towards 
acceptance of cultural diversity. However, due to the lack of 
mature democratic political culture, even the populist 
government of Zufikar Ali Bhutto
13
 did not or could not make 
much headway in actualizing the political/administrative 
expression of that diversity in any meaningful way. His 
insistence on his personal control of all the country led to armed 
                                                 
13 Prime Minister of Pakistan 1971-1977. Father of Benazir Bhutto, former prime 
minister of Pakistan and leader of Pakistan Peoples Party, which was founded by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967.  
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resistance by Balochs as well as a violent reaction among 
Pashtuns.
14
  
 
Pakistan saw another civilian interlude in the 1990s when 
two civilian prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz 
Sharif, took turns to rule the country. Both of them did not match 
the popular appeal of the senior Bhutto. Both ruled with the 
limitations on the exercise of their powers as a result of the 
continuous preponderance of the military in the country affairs 
and Zia Ul Haq’s introduction of an amendment in the 
constitution that tilted the constitution towards the President 
unevenly. They simply lacked the constitutional power or 
personal intellectual capabilities as well as political 
commitments, as both were closer to the centrist Pakistani 
position and such could not and did not even attempt to address 
the issues of identity, that were at the root of failure of 
democratic culture and institutions to develop.  
 
Contending Identities 
We will now briefly introduce some of the contending identities 
without going into their details. All of them require full separate 
studies. The main focus of this study is the understanding of 
Pakistani establishment view and dealing of identity issue and its 
consequences for democratic governance and not the specific 
identity challenges faced by the State of Pakistan.  
 
Pakistan’s early leaders sought to patch over domestic 
differences and tried to forge national identity on the basis of 
religious symbolism and centralization of authority. Pakistani 
rulers were consistently unsure that the will or consent of the 
people would be sufficient to unify the ethnically disparate 
people thrown together in the new country. Although Pakistan 
had been created on the assumption that the majority of Muslims 
                                                 
14 Hasan Askari Rizvi, “South Asia as seen by Pakistan”, South Asia Journal, a 
quaerterly journal of South Asia Free Media Association, Lahore 
http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/seenby_pakistan.htm. 
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in undivided India supported the demand for Pakistan, support 
for its creation had not been overwhelming in some of the 
regions that were included in it and the leadership of the 
movement for partition came overwhelmingly from areas that did 
not form Pakistan. This lack of local connection made that 
leadership of indigenous concerns and realities. Such attitudes 
also were a result of a typical post colonial authoritarian state 
that mistrusts popular initiation of any movement or change. This 
has squarely put the ethno-identity contenders in the forefront of 
popular movements for democracy and secularism. 
 
For the highly centralized post colonial state of Pakistan 
that was in the process of creating a national identity, any talk of 
provincial rights and differences based on culture, language or 
ethnicity were anathema. These were considered as negating the 
very basis of Pakistani nationhood, which was based on religion 
and the Urdu language. “Language is an important tool of 
imperialism, defined as the domination of one collectivity over 
another. The term ‘linguistic imperialism ‘defined as the 
privileging or domination of one language over others, refers to 
its use by the elites of power, culture, and money in so many 
domains as to limit the access of speakers of other languages to 
positions of power and privilege.
15
 Urdu became the defining 
basis for Muslim religious identity, which provided the 
justification for partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.
16
  
 
Insistence on Urdu as the only language became the first 
casus belli for the battle cry of various ethnic identities that made 
up the state of Pakistan. Bengalis
17
 rose up against Jinnah’s 
proclamation of Urdu as the only national language of Pakistan 
in 1948. This movement gradually led to an alienation process 
                                                 
15 Tariq Rehman, Language and Politics in Pakistan, Oxford, Pakistan Paperbacks 
Edition, 1996, p. 23.  
16 Ibid., pp. 59-78. 
17 Bengali Language Movement was launched to force Pakistani establishment to 
declare Bengali as a national language along with Urdu. 
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which rejected the Muslim/Islamic religious basis of Pakistani 
identity and paved the way for the ultimate breakup of Pakistan. 
It must be pointed out that Bengalis generally, and the 
leadership
18
 of this language and ethnic based identity were 
mainly Muslim Leaguers who had worked for the creation of 
Pakistan, a state based on religious identity.  
 
Unlike Bengalis Pashtun national movement was led by 
former Congress members. They called for renaming of North 
West Frontier Province as Pashtunistan in 1948.
19
 Pashtun 
identity has been at odds with Pakistani state identity since the 
beginning. They have always been a suspect in the eyes of the 
Pakistani establishment, due to their historical ties with Indian 
National Congress, Afghanistan and later Soviet Union. All these 
three states have been supporting Pashtuns’ national movements. 
Thus the Pashtun issue has an international and regional 
dimension. It is this external dimension coupled with Pakistani 
State’s use of religion as a tool of policy that explains Pakistan’s 
use of Muslim resistance to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. Pakistan’s connection with the Pashtun religious 
forces started in the 1970s,
20
 much before the Soviet intervention 
there. This mind set is at least partially responsible for Pakistan’s 
support for Taliban in Afghanistan. That support is a corollary of 
a policy of Talibanization/Islamization of Pashtun identity. It is 
this issue with secular Pashtun identity that is preventing 
                                                 
18 Sheikh Mujib Ur Rehman, founding father and leader of Bangladesh’s seccession 
from Pakistan in 1971, a student leader at the time of Bengali Language 
Movement’s inception in 1948 and actively leading it, was member of Muslim 
Student Federation, the student wing of Muslim League. Muslim League is the 
party that led the Pakistan movement. In fact Awami League came out of a split 
within the then Muslim League. 
19D. G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle, Popular Prakashan, 
Bombay, 1967, p. 451. 
20It was the secular government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that welcomed most of the 
later day Mujahideen leaders, including Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Buhannudin 
Rabbani in 1973 and trained and supported them against the Pashtun nationalist 
President of Afghanistan, Daud Khan. Daud Khan had been supportive of 
Pashtun nationalist challenge to Bhutto’s government in Pakistan. 
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Pakistan from going all out in its declared policy of aligning 
itself with ‘War against Terrorism’ today.  
 
Sindhi identity that gives its name to the province of 
Sindh faces a peculiar problem. Sindhi ethnic movement is the 
most aware and vocal of the different identities in the post 
Bangladesh (1971) Pakistan. They face the challenge of 
becoming a minority in their own province. Sindh’s largest towns 
like Karachi and Hyderabad are predominantly non Sindhi. Most 
Urdu speaking refugees from India after 1947 have chosen these 
cities to live in. The non Sindhi population have been multiplied 
manifold by large scale movement of industrial labour from rest 
of Pakistan, especially Pashtuns and Punjabis to the urban 
centres of Sindh. Sindh was scene of widespread language riots 
in 1970s, when the government of Pakistan Peoples’ Party 
introduced Sindhi as compulsory language in Sindh schools.
21
 
 
The language riots in Sindh in the 1970s gave spur to a 
new identity consciousness, the Muhajir (refugee) identity 
(referring to refugees from India only). By 1980s the Urdu 
speaking refugees started their own identity movement.
22
 This 
movement led by Altaf Hussain has added a new dimension to 
identity politics in Pakistan. It has specific relationship with the 
Pakistani establishment of both love and hate. A movement of 
urban middle class, it challenges the feudal structure of Pakistani 
state and society as well as the religious right in urban centres of 
                                                 
21Feroz Ahmed, “The National Question in Sindh” Pakistan Forum, Vol. 2, No. 
12, 1972, pp. 10-17+3. Also read Tariq Rahman, “Language and Politics in a 
Pakistan Province: The Sindhi Language Movement” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 
11, 1995, pp. 1005-1016. Sindhi Nationalists’ views can be found at good web 
site maintained by the Sindhi diaspora in US and UK at Sindhi World 
Congress Web site http://www.worldsindhicongress.org/. 
22Muhajir Quami Movement (Refugee National Movement) has become a force to 
reckon with in the urban centres of Karachi. Widely rumoured to have been 
sponsored by Gen. Zia to counter the popular appeal of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it has 
become a secular movement of middle class urban youth and is along with 
Bhutto’s party also stopped and rather reversed the appeal of the religious right  
mainly Jamat–e–Islami.  
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Sindh. Though Sindhi nationalists reject this new claimant to 
separate identity, their claim is an issue that has opened both 
practical and theoretical issues that has to be tackled both at 
theoretical and practical levels. Discussing that will take us out 
of the scope of the current study. 
 
Baloch identity contention has been the most vocal and 
violent. Pakistani State has used military force on three occasions 
- 1962, 1973-7, and 2004 to suppress its armed and violent 
expression. The Baloch territory flows into Iran as well. 
Balochistan became a full province only in 1970. The issue of 
Baloch identity is their smaller number and a very large territory, 
being the largest province of Pakistan. They have to contend with 
Pakistani State on one side and Pashtun identity on the other as 
Pashtuns almost form fifty percent of Balochistan’s population. 
Then they sit on vast riches of energy resources, thus attracting a 
lot of international and regional strategic and financial interests. 
They are tribal and educationally far behind the rest of the 
ethnicities that make up Pakistan. Their essentially tribal and 
feudal leadership represents their national aspirations. The 
Pakistani state has tried to increase its influence and assimilate 
their identity into the unitary Pakistani identity by using 
modernization, education and anti-tribalism as slogans.
23
 
 
Punjabi identity presents a different case. It is a majority 
identity that emerged in post-Bangladesh (1971) era. One notes a 
recent assertion of a Punjabi sense of identity.
24
 How deep it is 
                                                 
23A good study of the Baloch ethnic/national question has been done by Aijaz 
Ahmad. See his “The National Question in Balochistan” Pakistan Forum, Vol. 3, 
Nos. 8-9, Focus on Balochistan 1973, pp. 4-18, 37. 
24A sense of Punjabi national euphoria was created during and after a Punjabi 
international conference was held in Lahore, Pakistan on 30 January 2004. 
Representatives from both parts of Punjab were present. Punjab was divided in 
1947 between India and Pakistan. Chief Ministers of both the Punjabs were 
present on the occasion. For a good analysis of the conference and its impact on 
Punjabis and Pakistan read Moonis Ahmar’s “Punjabi Nationalism: Myth or 
Reality? The Daily News, Islamabad, 10 February 2004
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and what role it plays in the political front remains to be seen. 
Traditionally Punjab has remained the most amenable to the 
establishment’s sale of a unitary Pakistani identity, with no 
insistence on Punjabi language or any related issues. Perhaps that 
can be explained by the fact that it provided the ruling elite of the 
state and have been (at least its elite) the main beneficiary of 
Pakistani centrist structure and identity. 
 
It is important to note other contending ethnic identities, 
even if due to limitation of space one cannot deal with them in 
more detail. Some of the more vibrant ones are Saraikis in South 
Punjab and Brohis in Baluchistan or the not so vocal which 
includes Chitralis and Hazarwals in North West Frontier 
Province. 
 
All these contending identities have their own peculiar 
problems and the issue of accepting them as parts that form the 
plural Pakistani state level identity is not simply a question of 
recognition. It will require a lot of research, debate and 
accommodation within these identities as well. It must be 
remembered that there are a number of issues that need to be 
resolved between these identities as well as the issue of 
implications for modern education for development in the era of 
globalization, of accommodating in practical manner all these 
languages. However, one can start by accepting the fact that 
ignoring them or suppressing them has not been and is likely not 
to be the way to go about it. 
 
Conclusions 
The real answer to the continuing debate on Pakistani identity is 
not to look at history for an answer, for the history of Pakistan is 
inextricably entangled with the history of India, or as some 
would argue, was a part of it until 1947. The attempts to find 
justification for its creation by emphasizing the difference 
between Muslims and Hindus and providing religious basis for 
Pakistani identity and then trying to somehow delink religious 
scriptures from its governance has resulted an intellectually weak 
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argument. A gradual increase of the role of religious forces in the 
governance of the state is clearly noticeable to any keen student 
of political history of Pakistan. A gradual nexus has developed 
between Pakistani identity based on religion thus denying its 
plural social existence by promoting a unitary national identity, a 
continuous threat perception of India giving rise to security 
issues and thus resulting in the dominance of the military 
supported by a deeply entrenched colonial bureaucracy (and thus 
protecting its own privileged status) and state structure has 
defined state-society relations which are heavily tilted in favour 
of the state structure. The movements of the contending identities 
have found common cause with movement for secular 
democratic governance. By challenging the unitary identity based 
construction of the state these movements have become the main 
participants and expression of social justice, plurality, tolerance 
and democratic change. Thus any democratic change in 
Pakistan’s governance is tied with acceptance of the plural multi 
national/ethnic basis of Pakistani identity. This basic change will 
affect and be affected by changes in the India-centric threat and 
security perceptions. 
 
There is no need for Pakistani establishment to 
continuously look for justification for the creation of Pakistan, as 
the argument for its legitimacy for its continued existence and 
survival as State. Looking towards past has brought it to a 
confrontation with itself. States’ continued existence is justified 
and ensured by current and future policies and course of action 
and rarely if ever by past. How Pakistan addresses its plural 
identity issue will determine its future. The specific 
constitutional, administrative and political methods have to be 
looked into. For the issue is not so simple. The plural 
ethnic/national identities have their own issues. It involves a 
restructuring of provinces/federating units that reflects these 
identities. Followed by a really functioning federal structure it 
must be based on a real democracy that is not controlled actually 
or intellectually by any unitary structure like the military. Ethno 
nationalist identities have become the main source of strength for 
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democratic change in Pakistan. The autocratic state allied with 
religious overtones that have bred extremism and intolerance has 
correctly viewed ethno-nationalist movements as a threat to their 
continued status. They are, however, gravely mistaken to 
consider them as threat to state security. It is through 
accommodating and accepting the plurality that make up the state 
of Pakistan that its security can be ensured. That can only be 
achieved through a democratic process has also become 
sufficiently evident. In all fairness one must acknowledge that 
some elements within the state that can be termed as its more 
enlightened portion do realize this. However, they do not know 
how to go about it without fundamentally altering the power 
status quo, with which their interests are tied and they do not 
want to disturb. 
 
The answer lies in looking towards the future; for 
whatever reason, the Pakistani state is a reality today. Its more 
urgent need is to evolve a consensus on where it wants to go 
from here, not where it came from. And the manner it deals with 
its identity issue will determine that future to a deterministic 
level. 
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